Spying on the Bomb: American Nuclear Intelligence from Nazi Germany to Iran and North Korea

Dr. Jeffrey T. Richelson, arguably the most prolific and certainly the most technically correct writer about the U.S. intelligence community, has done it again. "Spying on the Bomb" describes, in Dr. Richelson's usual thorough and well-researched manner, the U.S. intelligence community's efforts to track--and influence--other nations' attempts to develop nuclear weapons.Dr. Richelson begins his story in Nazi Germany during World War II. Hitler, as it turned out, did not have a meaningful atomic bomb program, despite the worrisome presence in the Third Reich of renowned nuclear physicist Dr. Werner Heisenberg, who was certainly capable of designing one. After the War, the Soviet Union was the second nation to join the "nuclear club," detonating a fission bomb in 1949, years earlier than the "experts" had predicted. Today the nuclear club includes, for sure, Britain, China, France, India, Israel, Pakistan and South Africa. The evidence concerning North Korea and Taiwan is ambiguous (they probably have small nuclear arsenals), and Iran could join the club at any time. Dr. Richelson describes the nuclear programs of all of these nations at great length, as well as the efforts of countries such as Libya which tried and failed to get nuclear weapons by purchasing them.He also describes the many types of technological sensors that the U.S. used to detect nuclear weapon tests anywhere on the earth or in near-earth space, and to determine the characteristics of those that were tested. The U.S. deployed global arrays of seismic, acoustic, optical, radiation and electromagnetic sensors to detect nuclear bursts. For each test, the Air Force flew specially modified aircraft into the downwind radioactive cloud to "sniff" particles of the weapon debris, from which analysts could determine many details about the weapon type and design. These sensors, naturally, were only useful "after the fact." Unfortunately, they could not reveal that a nuclear test was GOING to happen, only that one HAD happened. To try to figure out IF and WHEN nations were going to test before they did so, the U.S. used other assets--photographic reconnaissance and electronic eavesdropping satellites, human agents ("spies") and diplomacy. The U.S. intelligence community's post-test analyses of other nations' nuclear tests were usually quite timely and accurate. But its record of correctly predicting "if" and "when" nuclear tests were going to take place was dismal. Virtually every foreign nuclear test was a surprise to U.S. analysts in one way or another. Their predictions of test dates, locations, bomb types, designs, fissionable materials, yields, etc., were often so far off the mark as to be worse than useless. The record of failure is so appalling that one wonders why analysts bothered to keep making predictions when they turned out to be so wrong so often.Long after I have forgotten the technical and operational details that Dr. Richelson describes in "Spying on the Bomb," I will remember three main points.One is that EVERY nation that today possesses nuclear weapons has lied about its intention to develop them. EVERY nuclear nation once protested that either "we are NOT going to develop nuclear weapons" or "our nuclear research is for peaceful purposes only." Then they went right ahead and developed the bomb. With the historical perspective that Dr. Richelson offers in this book, which might as well be entitled "Lying About the Bomb," I can't imagine how ANYONE can put any stock whatsoever in the promises of foreign leaders that they will not build atomic bombs. Such promises, in fact, should be considered insults.Another related point is that treaties are useless. Dr. Richelson does not explicitly say this--it is more of an "exercise for the reader." But he tells of several nations that signed the 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, or other agreements to refrain from developing atomic weapons in exchange for trade rights or economic aid, and then went right ahead and did what they wanted to do--build atomic bombs. Such treaties, in fact, may do more harm than good. If diplomats or analysts believe falsely that a nation is abiding by the terms of a treaty, they may not react quickly enough when evidence accumulates that the nation is simply ignoring the pretty words on the piece of paper.The third point, related to the U.S. intelligence community's consistent failure to accurately predict the nuclear activities of non-U.S. nations, has to do with a certain "technological arrogance." In the examples that Dr. Richelson cites, U.S. analysts seem to think that most other nations lack the scientific, engineering and manufacturing skills required to design and build an atomic bomb. The record clearly belies that assumption. They also seem to assume that every other nation MUST proceed along the same nuclear path that the U.S. took. But counter-examples abound. For example, U.S. analysts ASSUMED that any nation developing an atomic bomb would use plutonium for the fissionable material. China, however, shocked U.S. analysts by using highly enriched uranium instead of plutonium. Similarly, many analysts smugly assume that certain isotope separation techniques are "obsolete." But just because the U.S. does not use them today does not mean they are not perfect for some other less-advanced nascent nuclear nation.U.S. intelligence community analysts seem to lack a real-world appreciation for the importance of innovation, cleverness and adaptability, on which the U.S. does not have a monopoly, in the nuclear weapon development process. This short-sightedness has repeatedly led them, and the nation, to be unpleasantly surprised by foreign nuclear developments.

Jeffrey Richelson's "Spying On The Bomb" is an exhaustive unclassified account of the American Intelligence Community's effort to track the development of nuclear weapons by other countries. This effort began with fears that Nazi Germany might acquire the atomic bomb ahead of the Allies, transferred its attention to the Soviet Union after World War II, and afterward concerned itself with nations such as China, France, India, South Africa, and Libya. Most recently, and perhaps most notoriously, the U.S. Intelligence Community has attempted to track the nuclear ambitions of Iraq, Iran, and North Korea.Richelson has accomplished an impressive amount of research, based on public information, declassified sources, and a variety of personal interviews. The book represents perhaps the most coherent account possible at present without access to classified data.Out of this research comes a number of salient points. First, the U.S. record in tracking nuclear weapons development by other countries is a mixed bag of partial successes and some outright failures. Second, nuclear weapons development is an extremely hard target. No other target sets in these countries were and are so closely guarded by layered security, deception, lies, and espionage. Third, the U.S. effort has often been hamstrung as much by rivalries between intelligence agencies and indeed between individual analysts as by inadequacies in collection.Richelson doesn't formally summarize the U.S. intelligence effort at the end of his book. It may be that any fifty year campaign against multiple countries under vastly different circumstances lacks common threads beyond the nature of the target. With respect to the programs of some countries, no definitive determination of their status and hence no grade for the U.S. effort is yet possibleWhat Richelson does achieve is a straightforward account for the student of the intelligence community. For example, his narrative of the multiple failures to get right the Iraq nuclear threat is as accessible and as even-handed as any in print. The material on the lesser known nuclear programs, and on incidents such as the 1979 "flash of light" near South Africa, is fascinating.This book is highly recommended as an excellent resource for students of the intelligence community and of nuclear weapons development as policy.

This is an excellent effort and the information included is amazing. But I felt that, after a while, the author's capacity to write out ideas and information on paper just wasn't enough. It's a perfect effort to collect data but it become tiresome at the end.

Voici un ouvrage paru, si ma mémoire est bonne en 2004/2005, et qui était un travail de recherche du grand Jeffrey Richelson un spécialiste majeur de l'exploitation des archives déclassifiées des programmes d'espionnages américains. Les ouvrages de Richelson, notamment sur la NSA et le fameux traité UK/USA de 1947 qui créé le système Echelon, ont baigné ma jeunesse lorsque j'écrivais ma seconde thèse. Malheureusement, Richelson est décédé et il est incertain que l'on retrouve un auteur de son niveau.Cet ouvrage est d'une richesse incroyable avec l'exposé de l'ensemble des programmes d'espionnages des programmes nucléaires militaires étrangers, depuis le programme uranium des nazies jusqu'à des éléments documentaires sur l'Irak et Téhéran en passant par la Corée du Nord. Pour le lecteur francophone une des surprises majeures est de découvrir une activité de renseignement puissante et structuré concernant la France et son programme nucléaire : comme quoi comme l'indique Spinoza dans son traité du Politique," les États n'ont pas d'amis mais seulement des alliés". Je vous recommande vivement l'achat et la lecture de ce livre si vous avez une bonne maîtrise de l'anglais universitaire.

Eine dicht gepackte Zusammenfassungseit seit den ersten Tagen der Kernwaffenforschung durch Heisenberg und von Weizsäcker in ihrem verzweifelten Bemühen Hitler die Bombe zu liefern. Gefolgt von detailierten Beschreibungen der ersten unabhängigen Schritte des geheimen Sowjet-Programs in Tomsk und Swerdlovsks. Auch die Forschungsprogramme Südafrikas, Israels und natürlich Chinas, sowie der vergebliche Versuch John F. Kennedys sie zu stoppen werden minutiös dargestellt mit hochkarätigen Originalquellen.Das berühmte Lockheed U2 Flugzeug kommt ebenso wie das sateliten-basierte Vela Überwachungsprogramm nicht zu kurz. Ein von einem alternden Vela Satelit am 22. September 1979 detektiertes ("Vela 6911") Ereignis über dem Südatlantik wird ausführlich diskutiert: auch wenn die Möglichkeit einer atmosphärischen Detonation durch eine unbekannte Organisation nicht ausgeschlossen wird, so wird sie seriös abgewogen unter Einbeziehung der öffentlich bekannten Quellen.Ein hochaktuelles Buch über die vielleicht wichtigste Form der Aufklärung: die nukleare Spionage mit dem Ziel der Kontrolle dieser gefährlichen Waffentechnologie. Leider auch eine Geschichte der Misserfolge, die bis heute anhält. Insofern auch ein Weckruf an die Politik des Westens diese wichtige Geheimdiensttätigkeit besser zu finanzieren im Interesse auch zukünftiger Generationen. Es ist traurig, daß wir die Namen vieler Akteure in dieser Mission nie erfahren werden. Sie dienen als stille Helden der Zukunft der Menschheit.

Kind of long and rambling, but very informative and worth having, if you are into history of this nature.